Economic Policy [3HEFEK151V]
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Mechanics | The course is based mainly on the textbooks by Mueller and Persson and Tabellini which are available in the library. Additional sources are indicated below and will be specified in class. |
Requirements | This course has 9 Credit Points. In addition to participating in the lecture and passing the final exam, each student will be required to solve some problem sets in the tutorial. Each of these assignments is mandatory and will be part of the final grade. Details will be given in class. |
Content | Introduction
Property Rights, Transaction Costs and Economic Efficiency 2. Traditional View of Economic Policy 3. Social Welfare Part II: Democratic Economic Policy
Majority Voting and its Problems The Median-Voter 2. Economic Policy as a Principal-Agent Problem Probabilistic Voting Interest Groups and Bureaucracy Part III: Implementation of Economic Policy
2. Targets and Instruments, Assignment 3. Uncertainty 4. Rational Expectations and Time-Consistency 5. Rules vs. Discretion in Economic Policy Part IV: Partisan Economic Policy
Part V: Economic Policy in Practice
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Materials | Course materials will be provided via UNISONO.
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Literature | Acemoglu, Daron (2003) Why Not a Political Coase Theorem?, Journal of Comparative Economics 31, 620-652. Acocella, Nicola, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo and Andrew Hughes Hallett (2012) The Theory of Economic Policy in a Strategic Context, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Besley, Timothy (2006) Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dixit, Avinash (1996) The Making of Economic Policy, Cambridge: MIT-Press. Drazen, Allan (2000) Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hillman, Arye (2018) Public Finance and Public Policy, 3rd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (You may also use older editions.) Mueller, Dennis C. (2003) Public Choice III, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. North, Douglass C. (1990) A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2, 355-367. Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000) Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policies, Cambridge: MIT-Press. |